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ESTATES-EFFECT OF PowER IN LimE TENANT TO MAKE
SOLUTE DISPOSITION oF PROPERTY-GOVERNING

STATUTE.-A

ABnew

section of our Code provides:
"If any interest in or claim to real or personal property
be given by sale or gift inter vivos or by will to one, with a
limitation over either by way of remainder or of executory devise or any other limitation, and by the same conveyance or will
there be conferred, expressly or by implication, a power upon
the first taker in his lifetime or by will to use or dispose absolutely of such property, the limitation over shall not fail
or be defeated except to the extent that the first taker shall
have lawfully exercised such power of disposal. The proceeds of a disposal under such power shall be held subject to
the same limitations and the same power of use and disposal
as the original property, unless a contrary intent shall appear from the conveyance or will;" (Here follows a proviso
as to conveyance by deed of trust or mortgage.)
This section is patterned after Section 5147 of the Virginia
Oricr&,

CODE OF W. VA. (1931) c. 36, art. 1, § 16.
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Code of 1919' but with changes which very materially affect its
meaning. Section 5147 of the Virginia Code applies only to a
gift of an interest in property for life with a power of disposal
absolutely by deed or by will, and was intended to abolish the
doctrine of May v. Joynes,' a case decided in that state in 1857,
which became settled law both in Virginia' and in West Virginia.'
By the doctrine of this case a gift of a life estate with an absolute
power of disposal by deed gave the first taker a fee simple. Any
limitation over of what such first taker might have undisposed of
at his death was repugnant and void. But experience has shown
that the existence of this doctrine did not prevent testators from
attempting so to limit a remainder after a life estate with such a
power of disposal. Under the Virginia statute such testators will
have the evident intent expressed in their language effectuated, and
the rule of May v. Joynes will no longer operate to defeat such
intention. Under the above West Virginia statute such testator
may also have his intent effectuated, but here we find two very
material changes have been made.
The first change to be noted is that our act is not limited to
cases where the gift to the first taker is for life, but is intended to
extend to cases where the gift to the first taker is in fee, if it is
of land, or of absolute property, if it is personalty, provided there
follows a limitation over of what is undisposed of by deed or will.
The statute makes limitations over on intestacy valid.
Suppose
property is given to A, and any remaining undisposed of by deed
or will by A, to go over to B. This could be brought under the
Virginia statute only by construing the gift to A as a gift for
life, but so worded it would probably be construed as a gift in
fee' and if so the limitation over would be void. But such a
limitation over would be valid under our statute. Suppose a
gift to A and his heirs (or in fee simple) with a limitation over
of any that remained undisposed of by A by deed or by will.
This could not possibly be construed to come under the Virginia
statute but under our statute the limitation over would be valid.
But under our statute both of these supposed gifts in fee, in effect,
become gifts for life with power of absolute disposal by deed or by
will. In other words the limitation over of the property or any
CODE ANN. (1930) § 5147.
'20 Gratt. 348 (Decided in 1857 but published in 1871).
See collection of Virginia cases in VA. CODE ANI. (1930) § 5147.
rThe cases are collected in note (1930) 36 W. VA. L. QuAR. 288.
' Under VA. CODE ANN. (1930) § 5147 dispensing with necessity of words
of limitation.
'VA.
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residue on intestacy of A is made valid." The writer can see no
valid objection to this in so far as gifts of land are concerned
at least unless it is that our system of future interests is already
sufficiently wierd and wonderful without adding a new sort of
limitation. As to some forms of personal property such as money,
another objection was made by the early English courts which
both Mr. Gray and Mr. Kales believed had great weight. That
is, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to identify the subject
matter after the first taker has had it a number of years and the
gift over was accordingly held void.'
But both the Virginia
statute and our statute cover personalty as well as real estate.
In many cases the property consists of an estate, such as a farm
with stock and fixtures, so perhaps as a practical matter since
purely personal estates are seldom bequeathed in this manner, it
is better to class both sorts of property together than to attempt
to separate them."
As to this first change all the comment made by the Revisers
is, "It would seem the same provision should be made in cases of
more durable interests than life interests where there is a remainder or limitation over upon a contingency." The only "more
durable interests" we have must be a fee simple in land or absolute property on personalty.
This change does make these
"more durable interests" considerably less durable than formerly.
It is doubtful whether anyone will give absolute property to one,
and then make a gift over of any residue on intestacy so perhaps
this change will have little practical effect.
The second change is in the provision of our section that
"The proceeds of a disposal under such a power shall be held
subject to the same limitations and the same power of use and
7What in most jurisdictions is a fee simple absolute becomes a life estate
with power of disposal by deed or by will.
GBoth Professor Gray and Professor Kales have pointed out that there is
no rule of policy against a limitation over of property undisposed of. It
clearly does not restrain alienability. Most courts say the limitation is void
for repugnancy but this is merely a historical formula with no apparent
present reason supporting it.

See GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATiOx (2d ed.

1895) §§ 56-56b, 74-74g; IKAES, FUTURE INTERESTS (2d ed. 1920)
§§ 720-723.
'See GRAY, op. cit. supra n. 7, § 58 for early English cases and § 65 for
collection of American cases. The latter hold the limitation over void but
on the same ground given in the cases involving real estate. See also RATEs,
op. cit. supra "n.7, § 722.
2 In many cases since the property left consists of both realty and person.
alty it is probably simpler as a practical matter to treat both alike as provided in these statutes than to require the separate treatment of the two
hinds of property. Besides many forms of personal property are no more
difficult to identify than is the realty.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1931

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1931], Art. 5

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY

425

disposal as the original property, unless a contrary intent shall
appear from the conveyance or will". As to this sentence the
Revisers say "The provision with reference to the proceeds is not
included in the Virginia statute, but seems to afford a reasonable
working rule, in the absence of a contrary intent". What the
Revisers mean by "a reasonable working rule" the writer does
not understand. It is the opinion of the writer that the reasonable construction of both the Virginia act, and of that part of our
act which precedes the above quoted sentence, is, that if the first
taker disposes of the property or any part by deed the limitation
over is defeated as to any proceeds which the first taker may have
received for such property. In other words any disposal of the
property by deed defeats the limitation to that extent." If this
construction is correct then this new sentence in our act makes
a profound change in that it extends the limitation to proceeds
of any property disposed of by the first taker during his lifetime.
How much litigation may arise from this change it is difficult to
foresee. Suppose the first taker sells land under his power and
reinvests the proceeds mingled with money of his own in various
forms of property some of which increase in value and some of
which decrease in value, and from time to time sells and reinvests the proceeds of portions of this property. A problem of
following assets will arise as difficult and complicated as sometimes arises in trusts. Imagine the numerous things the first
taker may do with the proceeds which will cause troublesome,
annoying and expensive litigation and the only advantage will be
to permit an assumed intent of the testator to be carried out a
little more completely! Furthermrore this provision enhances
the objection that was made above to such gifts of money because
land sold will usually result in money proceeds and there will follow all the difficulties of identification of the property subject to
the limitation which the English courts foresaw. It is submitted
that this sentence ought to be eliminated from the statute as soon
as possible.
-JAMES

W.

SIMONTON.

The statute provides, ".
. . . the limitation over shall not fail or be
defeated except to the extent that the first taker shall have lawfully exercised
such power of disposal". The inference is justified that the limitation over
shall be defeated to the extent such power has been lawfully exercised. It
is submitted this is the reasonable construction and that if our statute ended
here the limitation over would not bind proceeds of a sale of the property.
This would be easy to administer except as to some forms of personalty such
as money, and ought to work well. It is submitted the "reasonable working
rule" of the Revisers has injected a great uncertainty and that we will have
a very complicated working rule.
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